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Equality, Ideology and Oppression:




What is "common" in and to women is the intersection of oppression and
strength, damage and beauty. It is, quite simply, the ordinary in women which
will "rise" in every sense of the word-spiritually and in activism. For us, to
be "extraordinary" or "uncommon" is to fail. History has been embellished
with "extraordinary", "exemplary", "uncommon", and of course "token"
women whose lives have left the rest unchanged. The "common woman" is
in fact the embodiment of the extraordinary will-to-survival in millions of
obscure women.... -Adrienne Rich'
The major objective of this article is to contribute to an under-
standing of the potential impact of the equality provisions of the Cana-
dian Charter of Rights and Freedoms2 on the lives of women. This re-
quires an awareness of the realities of women's inequality in our soci-
ety, an understanding of the legal conceptualization of equality, and a
consideration of the role of "law" in remedying societal injustice. My
focus in this article is on the second concern-that is, on legal theories
* Hons. B.A., University of Toronto (1980), LL.B., University of Toronto (1984),
Visiting Student, Dalhousie Law School, 1983-84, LL.M., Harvard University
(1985). I wish to thank Derek Jones for helping me to clarify my ideas in the
process of revising this paper. I also thank Christine Boyle for encouraging me
to share my paper with others.
1 Adrienne Rich, On Lies, Secrets and Silence, Selected Prose 1966-1978 (New York:
WW, Norton & Co., 1979), p. 255.
2 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, which is Schedule B of the Canada Act, 1982,
c. 11 (U.K.).
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of equality as they relate to women. I begin with a brief outline of
the conflicting ideological approaches that infuse legal thought on gen-
eral equality issues and their particular manifestations in the Canadian
Charter. The interplay of these contrasting theories is then considered
in a historical context of the legal treatment of women, followed by
a discussion of the current debate about equality for women in
Canada. Finally, I will offer some suggestions about the interpretive
direction I think the equality provisions in the Charter should take.
2. APPROACHES TO EQUALITY
Two preliminary observations can be made in analyzing the legal
conceptualization of equality. First, despite adherence to the principle
of equality in the legal system, widespread inequalities persist in our
society. Second, the legal treatment of equality is in a state of confu-
sion resulting from the uneasy and even contradictory co-existence of
different ideological concepts of, and approaches to, equality. On the
one hand, a formal conception of equality, rooted in liberalism 3 and
laissez-faire ideology, predominates. This conception is best 6ncapsu-
lated by the phrase "equality of opportunity" or procedural equality.
On the other hand, equality theory is still influenced by conservative
ideology, particularly by traditional patriarchal assumptions about the
role of women in society. Moreover, "post-liberal ' 4 conceptions of
equality that focus on outcomes or "equality of condition" have be-
come increasingly visible with the rise of the regulatory welfare state.
To understand the current state of equality theory, therefore, it is crit-
ical to begin by clarifying briefly the differences between these
ideological perspectives on equality.
3 For discussions of the rise of liberal thought, see C.B. Macpherson, The Political
Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,
1962); Macpherson, The Real World of Democracy (Oxford: Oxford Univ. Press,
1965); David Sugarman, "The Legal Boundaries of Liberalism and Legal Science,
Book Review: Cosgrove, The Rule of Law: A.V. Dicey Victorian Jurist" (1983),
46 Mod. L.R. 102 at 108. For a discussion of the liberal notion of equality, see
P. Kerans, "Philosophic Barriers to Equality", in Inequality: Essays on the Political
Economy of Social Welfare, A. Moscovitch and G. Drover, eds. (Toronto: Univ.
of Toronto Press, 19,1), p. 27.
4 This phrase is used by Roberto Unger in Law in Modern Society: Towards a Criti-
cism of Social Theory (New York: The Free Press, 1976). It has also been used in
the context of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms; see M. Gold, "A Prin-
cipled Approach to Equality Rights: A Preliminary Inquiry" (1982), 4 S. Ct. L.R.
131 at 154-157.
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The liberal conception of equality embodies three central features.
First, it is individualistic. It assumes that society is composed of au-
tonomous individuals in contrast to the more commuxitarian or
group focus of both conservative and emerging "post-liberal" ap-
proaches. Each individual has the right to be treated the same as (or
"equal" to) every other individual. The very notion of rights is derived
from liberal theory and contrasts with a more communitarian vision
of society held together by duties and responsibilities. As Carol Gilli-
gan explains, there is "a tension between a morality of rights that dis-
solves 'natural bonds' in support of 'individual claims' and a morality
of responsibility that knits such claims into a fabric of relationship,
blurring the distinction between self and others through the represen-
tation of their interdependence. "s
Second, the liberal theory of equality contemplates a non-inter-
ventionist state which interferes in social relations only when the acts
of one individual violate the individual rights of another. The state
does not assume responsibility for securing substantive or distributive
equality. Its obligations encompass only the duty to treat "like" indi-
viduals alike in areas where it has chosen to intervene.
The third important feature of the liberal notion of equality is its
faith in the neutrality of the "rule of law". 6 As Dicey explained it,
legal equality entails the "universal subjection of all classes to one law
administered by the ordinary courts. ' 7 All members of society are to
be governed by the rule of law; no longer is the formal application of
the law to vary according to one's social class or position. To this
extent, the liberal conception of the "rule of law" has been viewed as
a significant step forward from the overt hierarchical relations that
preceded it." As Francis Olsen has pointed out, however, it was
primarily "the mode of legitimation [that] shifted from a direct
acknowledgement of pervasive hierarchy to an indirect justification of
gross inequalities among juridical equals." 9 Equality, according to the
"rule of law" requires facially-neutral treatment; everyone is to be
5 In a Different Voice, Psychological Theory and Women's Development (Cambridge:
Harv. Univ. Press, 1982), p. 132.
6 A.V. Dicey, Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution (1985), 10th ed.
(London: MacMillan & Co., 1959), pp. 183-205; see also Sugarman, supra, note 3.
7 Dicey, p. 193.
8 E.P. Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origins of the Black Act (New York:
Pantheon Books, 1975), pp. 265-266.
9 F. Olsen, "The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform"
(1983), 96 Harv. L. Rev. 1497 at 1515.
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treated the same. Yet, treating those who are unequal in terms of their
access to power and resources as though they are the same allows
economic and social disparities to persist, while an illusion of fairness
is created. This formalistic conception of equality, in fact, contributes
to substantive inequality and at the same time, helps to create "a con-
sciousness that radically separates law from politics, means from ends,
processes from outcomes. ' ' 0
Although liberalism supplanted the former hegemony of conser-
vatism, the latter continues to influence our societal world view. Con-
servatism accepts and justifies social inequality rather than attempting
to deny its existence. It overtly sanctions hierarchical relations on the
basis of factors such as status, religion or paternalism. The most relev-
ant example, for our purposes, is male domination within the tradi-
tional family structure. A further important component of conser-
vatism is its more communitarian perspective; it views individuals as
integral members of social institutions, structures, and communities.
The continued presence of conservative ideology, particularly in rela-
tion to issues of gender equality, makes it a prime consideration in
any current analysis of equality theory and women.
Throughout the twentieth century, but particularly since the end
of World War II, post-liberal influences have also had an important
impact on equality theory. With the shift away from laissez-faire
capitalism and the increase in economic concentration, we have wit-
nessed a growing acceptance of government intervention in, and reg-
ulation of, the market. In addition, particularly since the 1930s, re-
sponsibility for social and economic welfare programs has been as-
sumed by the state." As Unger describes it, "[t]he response to unjus-
tified hierarchy, a response the rule of law failed to provide, is now
sought from the government ... As the state becomes involved in
the tasks of overt redistribution, regulation,and planning, it changes
into a welfare state."1 2 The nineteenth century liberal belief in the im-
portance of equal treatment of autonomous individuals is undermined
10 M. Horwitz, "The Rule of Law, An Unqualified Human Good!" (1977), 86 Yale
L.J. 561. For a similar view, see Unger, Knowledge and Politics (New York: The
Free Press, 1975), p. 151.
11 See generally, I. Gough, The Political Economy of the Welfare State (London: Mac-
Millan, 1979). For an analysis of the United. States, see T. Lowi, The End of
Liberalism-The Second Republic of the United States, 2d ed. (New York: W.W. Nor-
ton & Co., 1979), p. 42. For a case study of the rise of unemployment insurance
in Canada, seeJ. Struthers, No Fault of Their own, Unemployment and the Canadian
Welfare State, 1914-1941 (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1983).
12 Unger, supra, note 4 at p. 193.
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as it becomes apparent that social welfare programs operate on the
principle that those in need" should receive greater social assistance.
Unequal treatment is required to generate just outcomes (i.e. an
adequate level of food and shelter for everyone). Thus, there emerges
a focus on equality of outcomes rather than on procedures.
Closely linked to the rise of the regulatory welfare state is an
acknowledgement that social and economic equality, as well as civil
and political equality, is important. One example of this development
is the creation of two international covenants on human rights-the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights.
1 3
Finally, the recognition of myriad social groups and associations
also characterizes post-liberal society, in marked contrast to the indi-
vidualistic focus of nineteenth century liberalism. To some extent,
liberalism has accommodated this shift by developing theories of
pluralism whereby group units replace individuals in the competitive
market. 4 An acknowledgement of diverse, cohesive, and discernible
social groups in society has important implications on equality theory.
It undermines the myth, central to the liberal vision of equality, of a
society of undifferentiated individuals. The liberal concern with the
treatment of individuals does not address inequalities between social
groups.
A further dimension of this group-based perspective is the rise of
a collective consciousness within various oppressed societal groups
and their articulation of alternative visions of what equality means.
At the core of these new visions is both a re-affirmation of the distinc-
tive skills, values, and cultures of subordinated social groups and a
rejection of the white male world view as universal.Is To counter the
13 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res 220 (XXI) U.N. Doc.
A/6316 (1966); International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, G.A.
Res. 220 (XXI), U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); both instruments, as well as the Op-
tional Protocol to the former Covenant, were adopted December 16, 1976 and
acceded to by Canada May 19, 1976.
14 See H. Laski, Grammar of Politics (London: Allen & Unwin, 1925) at p. 60; Ivan
Rand, "Responsibility of Labour Unions" in Special Lectures of the Law Society of
Upper Canada 1954-Labour Law and Labour Relations, Part I (Toronto: Richard de
Boo, 1954), p. 27 at p. 42;J.K. Galbraith, American Capitalisin (New York: 1952),
pp. 108-117 and pp. 135-141.
15 See Gilligan, supra, note 5; A. Miles, "Ideological Hegemony in Political Dis-
course: Women's Specificity and Equality" in Feminism in Canada, A. Miles and
G. Finn, eds. (Montreal: Black Rose Books, 1982) for examples of this phenome-
non in the women's movement. See also K. Lahey, Feninism, Theory and Method:
Developing Approaches to Legal Theory, University of Windsor, 1984 (manuscript).
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hegemony of the white male world view, the quest for equality entails
the manifestation of differences rather than conformity to dominant
norms. Equality thus requires the embracing of social diversity.16
The rise of the regulatory welfare state and the emergence of post-
liberal society also brought changes in legal thinking. Most notably,
the realist critique of legal formalism challenged the underlying prem-
ises of liberal legalism."7 By bringing to light the historical con-
tingency of legal doctrine and the indeterminacy of supposedly neutral
and scientific legal rules, legal realists blurred the line between law
and politics.' 8 Indeed, they ushered in the modern legal orthodoxy of
a continued but shaken faith in the neutrality of legal doctrine, care-
fully tempered by policy-oriented legal reasoning."'
In the context of equality theory, post-liberal thinking has
stretched and modified the parameters of the liberal conception of
equality. The ultimate threat post-liberal trends present to the coher-
ence of liberal legalism, however, has ensured that any incorporation
has been partial. This is illustrated by two doctrinal developments in
equality law: the "reasonable classification" doctrine and "disparate
impact" analysis.
(a) Reasonable Classification
The "reasonable classification" doctrine developed in the United
States for assessing whether a statute adhered to the constitutional
principle of the "equal protection of the laws."20 In a society increas-
16 A. Lorde, "Age, Race, Class and Sex: Women Redefining Difference" in Lorde,
Sister Outsider: Essays and Speeches (Trumansburg: The Crossing Press, 1984), p.
114 at pp. 122-123; see also M. Minow, Learning to Live With the Dilemma of Differ-
ence: Bilingual and Special Edqcation (1985), 48 Law and Contemporary Problems
157.
17 For a summary of the rise of legal realism in the United States, see E. Purcell Jr.,
The Crisis of Democratic Theory (Lexington: Univ. of Kentucky Press, 1973); see
also E. Mensch, "The History of Mainstream Legal Thought," in The Politics of
Law-A Progresive Critique, D. Kairys, ed. (New York: Pantheon Books, 1982),
p. 18 at pp. 26-29.
18 Mensch, note 17, supra.
19 This new orthodoxy is often referred to as the post-realist synthesis. It is rep-
resented by scholarly works such as H. Hart and A. Sacks, The Legal Process:
Basic Problems in the Making and Application of Law (tent. ed. 1958).
20 The Fourteenth Amendment (1868) of the United States Constitution provides:
Section I. All persons born and naturalized in the United States, and subject
to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State
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ingly characterized by statutory regulation, some justifying
mechanism was needed to save legislative classification from constitu-
tional invalidity on the grounds of inequality. Tussman and tenBroek,
in their classic article, "The Equal Protection of the Laws ' 21 posed the
problem in this way:
Here, then is a paradox: the equal protection of the laws is a "pledge of the
protection of equal laws". But laws may classify.... And the very idea of
classification is that of inequality.Y
Tussman and tenBroek proceeded to solve this paradox by developing
the "reasonable classification" doctrine. They maintained that the pri-
mary principle of constitutional equality is that those similarly situated
are to be treated similarly, or to put it another way, that "likes" are
to be treated alike. A legislative classification is reasonable and there-
fore constitutionally valid, if it covers all those similarly situated with
respect to the purpose of the law. While reinforcing the "equal treat-
ment" idea of liberal equality theory and focussing on proceduralism,
Tussman and tenBroek succeeded in finding a way to justify the in-
stances of unequal treatment inherent in the task of legislating in a
modem society.
It should be noted that in the United States, a formalistic gloss
developed in the application of the "reasonable classification" doc-
trine. Legislation that was classified as economic or social regulation
was subjected to a very weak test of constitutionality, namely, whether
the law had a rational basis.' In contrast, racial and ethnic classifica-
tions were subjected to the "strict scrutiny" standard, whereby a com-
pelling state interest and a close fit between means and ends were re-
quired. 24 Effectively, this test made it impossible to justify racial or
ethnic classifications. A formalistic classificatory exercise, therefore,
became determinative of the outcome. In contrast to racial classifica-
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall ab-
ridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall
any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of
the laws.
21 (1949), 37 Cal. L.R. 341.
22 Ibid., p. 344.
23 L. Tribe, American Constitutional Law (New York: Foundation Press, 1978) at pp.
994-996, s. 16-2.
24 Ibid., pp. 1000-1002, s. 16-6.
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tions, sex-based classifications have not attracted strict scrutiny, al-
though an intermediate level of scrutiny has emerged, in which legis-
lative classifications must be "substantially related" to "important
governmental objectives.""5
While the "reasonable classification" doctrine appears somewhat
formalistic, it incorporates non-formalistic reasoning to the extent
that it relies on a general standard of reasonableness. The development
of open-ended standards such as "fairness" or "reasonableness" re-
quires the overt acknowledgement of policy considerations in legal
decision-making. This shift away from formalism is a further manifes-
tation of the influence of post-liberalism.26 Furthermore, the reasona-
ble classification doctrine resolves the contradiction between "legisla-
tive specialization and constitutional generality"2 by virtue of its ex-
treme malleability. A narrow or a broad interpretation of a law's pur-
pose or the definition of "similarly situated" is determinative of the
constitutionality of the law and the outcome of the exercise.2" In some
cases, "similarly situated" is simply defined to mean all those posses-
sing the classifying trait which is the source of discrimination in the
first place (e.g. pregnant persons).2 9 Thus the reasonable classification
doctrine, though coherent on the face, risks reducing the equal protec-
tion of the laws to a tautology.
(b) Disparate Impact
The second doctrinal development of importance to equality
theory was the emergence of "disparate impact" analysis. It signalled
a direct departure from a liberal focus on procedures to a post-liberal
concern with outcomes. Though rationalized in liberal terms, it repre-
sents a critical threat to the theoretical coherence of the liberal
paradigm of equality. In the path-breaking case of Griggs v. Duke
Power Inc., 3 the United States Supreme Court recognized that rules
or procedures that were neutral on their face could have a "disparate
25 Ibid., pp. 1063-1066, s. 16-25; see, in particular, Craig v. Boren (1976), 429 U.S.
190.
26 Unger, supra, note 4 at pp. 199-200; see also supra, note 17.
27 Tussman and tenBroek, supra, note 21 at p. 344.
28 See Note, "Legislative Purpose, Rationality and Equal Protection" (1972), 82
Yale L.J. 123.
29 See Geduldig v. Aiello (1974), 417 U.S. 484.
30 (1971), 401 U.S. 424.
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impact" on different classes of individuals. The Canadian Supreme
Court has endorsed a disparate impact approach to the interpretation
of human rights statutes. Legislation has also provided for such an
approach.31 Moreover, in the interpretation of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms, the Supreme Court has accepted the importance
of an effects-based approach. 32 The consequences of effects-based
reasoning and disparate impact analysis are far-reaching. They strike
at the heart of the liberal formalist belief in the fairness of facially-neu-
tral rules and procedures. These consequences also open to scrutiny
and question the unequal outcomes institutionalized into the very fab-
ric of social structures and practices. No doubt, courts will undertake
to draw legal lines to lessen the potential effect of this new mode of
reasoning. 33 Nevertheless, post-liberal influences are straining liberal
equality theory.
3. THE CHARTER OF RIGHTS AND FREEDOMS AND
THE EQUALITY PROVISIONS
In both form and content, the Charter of Rights and Freedoms rep-
resents an amalgam of the different ideological visions of equality that
we have been discussing. At the same time, the ambiguity of the lan-
guage of the Charter leaves it open to a number of possible interpreta-
tions. Given these two countervailing characteristics, ideology will
play a vital role in determining the outcome of Charter cases, both in
the values and beliefs ofjudges that infuse the interpretive task and in
the ideological structure of the Charter as developed by the framers.
The first manifestation of ideological tension in the Charter ap-
pears in the Preamble, which affirms in one breath both the "supre-
macy of God"-an appeal to religious and conservative values-and
31 See Ontario Human Rights Commission and O'Malley v. Simpsons-Sears Ltd. (1985),
52 O.R. (2d) 799, 17 Admin. L.R. 89, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 64 N.R. 161 (S.C.C.);
Bhinder v. Canadian National Railway Co., [1985] 2 S.C.R. 561, 17 Admin. L.R.
111, 23 D.L.R. (4th) 481, 63 N.R. 185 (S.C.'C.); see for example, Canadian Human
Rights Act, S.C. 1976-77, c. 33, ss. 7 and 10; Ontario Human Rights Code, S.O.
1981, c. 53, s. 10.
32 See, for example, R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., [1985] 1 S.C.R. 295, 37 Alta. L.R.
(2d) 97, [1985] 3 W.W.R. 481, 18 D.L.R. (4th) 321, 58 N.R. 81, 60 A.R. 161, 18
C.C.C. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
33 For a United States example, see Washington v. Davis (1976), 426 U.S. 229; see
also A. Freeman, "Antidiscrimination Law: A Critical Review," in Kairys, supra,
note 17 at p. 96.
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the "rule of law"-the foundation of liberal legalism. 34 The general
idea of a Charter, however, is rooted in liberal theory. The Charter is
viewed as a document that provides protection against obtrusive gov-
ernment power.3- Yet, a strictly narrow focus on government abuses
of rights and freedoms raises two obstacles to the attainment of equal-
ity.
First, to secure a greater measure of social equality, more, rather
than less, government intervention may be required. If all the Charter
does is to require non-discrimination in those areas in which the gov-
ernment has chosen to intervene, its ability to facilitate equality for
women will be minimal. Whether the Charter goes beyond being a
negative check on government action, to impose positive obligations
on government, is unclear. Some commentators maintain that the
Charter can be interpreted to support the concept of positive rights.
36
Such an approach reflects the influences of the post World War II de-
velopment of the welfare state and diverges directly from classical
liberalism.
The second problem of the narrow view of the function of the
Charter, which limits it to a check on "public" or government power,
is that it leaves non-governmental or "private" manifestations of arbi-
trary power or violations of constitutional rights unchecked. Such a
reading would significantly limit the protection afforded by the Char-
ter. In any event, it is becoming increasingly difficult to demarcate
governmental versus non-governmental or public versus private
spheres of activity. Neither a formalist nor functionalist approach pro-
vides a coherent means of line-drawing. 37
The substantive scope of the Charter is also contested. Is it limited
primarily to civil, political and legal rights and freedoms, or does it
34 The Preamble reads:
Whereas Canada is founded upon principles that recognize the supremacy of
God and the rule of law.
35 See, for example, P. Hogg, Constitutional Law in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto:
Carswell, 1985), p. 651.
36 See the discussion in C. Boyle, Sexual Assault (Toronto: Carswell, 1984), pp.
32-41.
37 For contrasting discussions of the scope of application of the Charter, see K. Swin-
ton, "Application of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms," in The
Canadiatt Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Commentary, W. Tarnopoisky and G.
Beaudoin, eds. (Toronto: Carswell, 1982), ch. 3, and D. Gibson, "The Charter
of Rights and the Private Sector" (1982), 12 Man. L.J. 213. See also Y. de Mon-
tigny, "Section 32 and Equality Rights," in Equality Rights and the Canadian Char-
ter of Rights and Freedoms, A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts, eds. (Toronto: Carswell,
1985), ch. 13.
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extend to economic, social and cultural rights? Different sections of
the Charter appear to provide different responses. 3 Liberal theory fo-
cuses on the political, civil and legal rights of individual citizens, be-
lieving these to be essential prerequisites to the health and growth of
a democratic society. Social and economic rights are not considered
to be within the appropriate purview of constitutional adjudication
since they require an inquiry into the substantive outcomes generated
by the economic and social structures of society. Cultural rights are
also minimized by liberals to the extent that they entail an acknow-
ledgement of rights of collectives over rights of individuals. An ilust-
ration of the demarcation sometimes made between civil, legal and
political versus social, cultural and economic rights is the creation of
two separate international human rights covenants to cover these
categories.3 9
The individual versus collective rights issue also has ideological
underpinnings. Many of the rights and freedoms in the Charter appear
to be designed to protect the individual citizen from the State or the
majority. 40 Individual rights and freedoms are fundamental to the lib-
eral vision of society. At the same time, however, the Charter may be
interpreted to extend protection to certain collective rights, implicitly
acknowledging the existence of distinct groups and collectivities that
possess rights and duties. 4' The notion of collective rights, which con-
tains faint echos of the conservative acceptance of community, repre-
sents an important post-liberal concept.
In addition to the substantive provisions of the Charter, the
methodological approach to Charter adjudication has ideological im-
plications. While some judges may try to apply traditional formalistic
legal reasoning to Charter cases, identifying bright line categories or
definitions of rights and freedoms in an attempt to retain the myth of
the political neutrality and rule-like certainty of judging, others will
adopt a more purposive and policy-based approach.4 2 The latter ap-
38 The right to vote and legal rights provide examples of the former. For examples
of the latter see section 15(2) as well as freedom of association, language rights
and mobility rights.
39 Supra, note 13.
40 See, for example, sections 7-14.
41 This would depend on the interpretation given to sections such as section 2(a)
and (d) and section 15.
42 In a recent address to the University of Ottawa Conference on the Supreme Court of
Canada, ChiefJustice Dickson endorsed a purposive and policy-based approach,
October 4, 1985, at p. 12; see also R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, note 32 at
p. 344 (S.C.R.).
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proach diverges from classical liberal legalism, although it by no
means acknowledges the direct link between law and politics. It repre-
sents a hybrid of legal formalism and legal realism; it admits the partial
impurity or implausibility of legal formalism to sustain the fundamen-
tal message of formalism that the rule of law is more than just an
imposition of the subjective values and political biases ofjudges. The
inclusion of section 1 of the Charter exemplifies this shift away from
traditional legal formalism. It provides:
The Canadian Charter ofRights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms
set out in it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can
be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.
This section invites a purposive and interest-balancing approach to
Charter violation cases. It demands the adjudication of constitutional-
ity according to the vague and open-ended standard of "reasonable-
ness". A law would only be demonstrably justified if its legislative
purpose was reasonable, non-arbitrary and important in a free and
democratic society. In addition, the trait chosen as the basis for class-
ification should bear a reasonable or rational relationship to the pur-
pose of the statute. Thus, a law would not be constitutional if it over
or underclassified the group targeted by the legislation in question.
The equality provisions themselves also reveal ideological ten-
sion. 43 Subsection 15(1) provides:
15.(1) Every individual is equal before and under the law and has the right
to the equal protection and equal benefit of the law without discrimination
and, in particulaT, without discrimination based on race, national or ethnic
origin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
On the one hand, this section reflects the biases of liberal thought by
emphasizing the individual and mandating equal treatment. On the
other hand, it may be argued that the section does not simply require
abstract procedural equality; it is broad enough to ensure substantive
equality of outcomes. The right to "equal benefit of the law" in sub-
section 15(1) and the provisions of subsection 15(2) support this second
interpretation. Subsection 15(2) states:
43 For general discussions of section 15, see M. Gold, supra, note 3; W. Tarnopolsky,
"The Equality Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1983),
61 Can. B.R. 242 and "The Equality Rights" in Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin, eds.,
supra, note 37 at p. 395; S. McIntyre, "The Charter: Driving Women to Abstrac-
tion," in Broadside, March 1985, at pp. 8-9.
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Subsection (1) does not preclude any law, program or activity that has as its
object the amelioration of conditions of disadvantaged individuals or groups
including those that are disadvantaged because of race, national or ethnic ori-
gin, colour, religion, sex, age or mental or physical disability.
This subsection explicitly recognizes the need for special treatment or
affirmative action to redress inequities arising from discrimination,
and ensures that such measures will not be precluded by an unduly
restrictive or formal interpretation of subsection 15(1). Different indi-
viduals and groups are entitled to receive different treatment depend-
ing on the historical realities of their position in society. Subsection
15(2) acknowledges that society does not correspond to the traditional
liberal myth of undifferentiated, atomized individuals.
Section 28 addresses solely the question of gender equality. As
with section 15, the meaning ofsection 28 is ambiguous. It provides:
Notwithstanding anything in this Charter, the rights and freedoms referred
to in it are guaranteed equally to male and female persons.
Some commentators argue that this section, when combined with the
protection afforded in section 15, prohibits all sex-based classifications.
According to Katharine dejong, section 28 overrides section 1, which
she maintains is the only mechanism through which limits on absolute
equal treatment could be upheld." Others suggest that section 28
"means and accomplishes nothing."'45 Still others interpret section 28
as a general affirmation of the importance of ensuring sexual equality
in Canadian society. 46
The Charter is not a panacea for the problem of continuing subor-
dination of women in our society. Yet, given the importance of law
as part of the "social totality, ' 47 it is essential that feminists assess the
potential of the Charter for advancing the human rights of women. In
44 "Sexual Equality: Interpreting Section 28," in A.F. Bayefsky and M. Eberts,
eds., supra, note 37, p. 493 at pp. 524-525.
45 E.A. Driedger, "The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms" (1982), 14 Ot-
tawa L.R. 366 at 373; see also discussion of this perspective in de Jong, note 44
at pp. 516-518.
46 See, for example, K. Swinton, "Regulating Reproductive Hazards in the Work-
place: Balancing Equality and Health" (1983), 33 Univ. of T.L.J. 45.
47 This term is used by G. Lukacs in History and Class Consciousness, trans. R.
Livingston (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1971). See also K. Klare, "Law-Making as
Praxis" (1979), 40 Telos 123 at 128-133 for his discussion of the constitutive
theory of law.
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so doing, a review of the legal treatment of women constitutes a useful
starting point.
4. THE LEGAL TREATMENT OF WOMEN
In reviewing the legal treatment of women, it is important to
acknowledge the perceived division of society into public and private
spheres. Historically, women have been relegated primarily to the
household, men to the market. This division of labour has had critical
implications with respect to the legal treatment of women and has
deeply influenced theories of gender equality. While the liberal concep-
tion of equality prevailed with respect to men in the market sector,
conservatism still informed the familial reality and the treatment of
women active in the market or public sphere. Thus, the law treated
women differently and as inferior to men either in the guise of special
protection or through an outright denial of rights. The emergence of
the "rule of law", which proclaimed the formal equality of "individu-
als" to exercise the right to own property and to contract freely, em-
braced only male individuals. Women were excluded from the "rule
of law" because its concern was exclusively in the public sphere. The
private sphere of the home and the family was beyond the reach of
the law where the father or husband was considered sovereign. Since
women did not belong in the public sphere, the juridical equality of
citizens did not apply to them. Women were denied the right tb vote
and the right to hold public office. Upon marriage, women lost their
right to own property and contract on their own behalf.4
The complete exclusion of women from the formal equality pro-
vided by the "rule of law" ideology is reflected in early case law. This
jurisprudence is also interesting in that it embodies an unlikely har-
mony between conservatism and liberalism. Conservative notions
about women's "proper" functions did not conflict with the growing
hegemony of liberalism in the public sphere.
An interesting example is the 1905 case of Mabel French, who
was denied the right to be admitted to the Barristers' Society in New
Brunswick since the word "person" in the Barristers' Act was held not
to include women.49 As ChiefJustice Tuck stated:
48 M. Eberts, "The Rights of Women," in The Practice of Freedom, R. St. J. Mac-
Donald, ed. (Toronto: Butterworths, 1978), p. 225 at pp. 225-226.
49 In re Mabel P. French (1905), 37 N.B.R. 359 (N.B.S.C.).
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My own opinion is that it was never in the contemplation of the legislature
that a woman should be admitted an attorney of this Court, and that the word
"person" in the section applies only to males, the only persons qualified at
common law. I think the application of Miss French must be refused. s°
As late as 1928 in the infamous "Persons Case", the Supreme
Court of Canada held that women were not "persons" under the
British North America Act and thus not eligible for the Senate. It was
only upon appeal to the BritishJudicial Committee of the Privy Coun-
cil that the decision was reversed.5 1
The logic of denying women access to the public sphere was
based on what has been termed "separate sphere" ideology.-2 It was
most plainly articulated in Bradwell v. Illinois, a United States decision
involving the same issues as the Mabel French case:
[Tlhe civil law, as well as nature herself, has always recognized a wide differ-
ence in the respective spheres and destinies of man and woman. Man is, or
should be, woman's protector and defender. The natural and proper timidity
and delicacy which belongs to the female sex evidently unfits it for many of
the occupations of life. The constitution of the family organization, which is
founded in the divine ordinance, as well as the nature of things, belongs to
the functions of womanhood.'
The same rationale underlined the passage of special protective
legislation for women workers. In Ontario, for example, the Factory
and Shops Act was amended in 1901 to limit the hours of work for
women and children and to prohibit the employment of children
under the age of fourteen and of young girls and women whose repro-
ductive capacity could be injured at work. 4 This kind of protective
legislation was explicitly endorsed by United States courts through
reliance on sexist reasoning.
That woman's physical structure and the performance of maternal functions
place her at a disadvantage in the struggle for subsistence is obvious. This is
50 Ibid., p. 362.
51 Edwards v. Attorney General for Canada, [1930] A.C. 124, [1929] 3 W.W.R. 479,
[1930] 1 D.L.R. 98 (P.C.); see also E. Atcheson, M. Eberts and B. Symes, Women
and Legal Action, Precedents, Resources and Strategies for the Future (Ottawa: Can.
Council on the Status of Women, 1984), p. 11.
52 See N. Taub and E. Schneider "Perspectives on Women's Subordination and the
Role of Law," in Kairys, supra, note 17 at p. 117 and esp. at pp. 125-127.
53 Bradwell v. Illinois (1873), 16 Wall. 141 at 141.
54 N. Miller Chenier, Reproductive Hazards at Work (Ottawa: Can. Adv. Council on
the Status of Women, 1982), p. 40.
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especially true when the burdens of motherhood are upon her. Even when they
are not, by abundant testimony of the medical fraternity continuance for a long
time on her feet at work ... tend to injurious effects upon her body, and as
healthy mothets are essential to vigorous offspring, the physical well-being
of women becomes an object of public interest ... in order to preserve the
strength and vigor of the race. . . . Still again, history discloses the fact that
woman has always been dependent upon man. He established his control in
various forms, and with diminishing intensity, it has continued to the pre-
sent."5 (emphasis added)
Women workers, therefore, received the protection all workers needed
at the expense of their alleged inferiority to men being reinforced by
the courts.5 6 Such judicial pronouncements represent a conservative
ideological approach to gender inequities.
In recent years there has been a discernible shift in the legal treat-
ment of women. The legal disabilities formerly imposed on married
women have been abolished.5 Most Canadian women obtained the
right to vote following World War 1.ss It was not until the 1960s and
thereafter, however, that legislation prohibiting sex discrimination de-
veloped. The focus of this reform was the treatment of women in the
"public sphere". Anti-discrimination statutes mandated the equal
treatment of men and women in employment, in the provision of
goods and services and in housing. s9 In addition, the Canadian Bill of
Rights was passed which included a provision against discrimination
based on sex. 60
The idea behind these reforms was the following. Individual
women were not to be pre-judged according to stereotyped gender
roles; rather, they were to be treated in accordance with what they
individually merited. The law prescribed that women be treated the
55 Muller v. Oregon (1908), 208 U.S. 551 at 556, 28 S. Ct. 324 at 326.
56 F. Olsen, supra, note 9 at p. 1559.
57 Eberts, supra, note 48.
58 C. Cleverdon, The Women's Suffrage Movement in Canada, 2d ed. (Toronto: Univ.
of Toronto Press, 1974).
59 W. Tarnopolsky, Discrimination and the Law (Toronto: Richard de Boo, 1982) ch.
VIII at p. 255.
60 S.C. 1960, c. 44. Section 1 provides:
1. It is hereby recognized and declared that in Canada, there have existed
and shall continue to exist without discrimination by reason of race, national
origin, colour, religion or sex, the following human rights and fundamental
freedoms, namely, . ..
(b) the right of the individual to equality before the law and the protection
of the law ...
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same as men in the public sphere. Thus, the influence of liberal ideol-
ogy was being felt in the legal response to the problem of sex discrimi-
nation. At the same time, however, conservative ideology continued
to affect legal theories of gender equality. The law maintained that
where a "real" biological difference existed between women and men,
the law should or could treat the sexes differently.6' Thus, the judiciary
reconciled the tension between liberal and conservative ideology by
integrating strands of both into a hybrid liberal-conservative theory
of equality.
There are a number of problems associated with this hybrid con-
ception, even though it appears to be the most widely-accepted ap-
proach at present. The most important problem is the inherent con-
tradiction it contains. The law is trying both to admit and to deny
that differences exist between women and men. The result is confu-
sion. For example, judges confound biological differences with so-
cially-determined differences, or in confirming biological differences
they justify detrimental differential treatment. Professor Catherine
MacKinnon captures the essence of the problem when she writes:
The relationship between woman's anatomy and her social fate is the pivot
on which turns all attempts, and opposition to attempts, to define or change
her situation. At every turn, nature appears hand in glove with culture, so
that the special definition of woman's place within man's world appears to
conform exactly to her differences from him. But the same reality can be seen
as the fist of social dominance hidden in the soft glove of reasonableness-the
ideology of biological fiat. 2
61 Even the Equal Rights Amendment, 86 Stat. 1523 (1972) in the United States, which
was widely believed to mandate absolute legal equality between women and men,
still was said to permit differential treatment with respect to "unique physical
characteristics" according to its most widely accepted interpretation. As stated
in G. Falk et at., "The Equal Rights Amendment: A Constitutional Basis for
Equal Rights for Women" (1971), 80 Yale L.J. 871 at 909:
The fundamental legal principle underlying the Equal Rights Amendment,
then, is that the law must deal with a classification based on the broad and
impermissible attribute of sex. This principle, however, does not preclude
legislation (or other official action) which regulates, takes into account, or
otherwise deals with a physical characteristic unique to one sex .... Legisla-
tion of this kind does not... deny equal rights to the other sex. So long as
the law deals only with the characteristic found in all (or some) women, it
does not ignore individual characteristics found in both sexes in favor of an
average based on one sex.
62 C. MacKinnon, The Sexual Harassment of Working Women (New Haven: Yale Univ.
Press, 1979), p. 101.
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The case law dealing with pregnancy-related discrimination illus-
trates most clearly the shortcomings of this judicial reasoning. When
Stella Bliss invoked the equality provisions of the Canadian Bill of
Rights to challenge the Unemployment Insurance Act' on the grounds
that it treated pregnant women more harshly than other workers, the
Supreme Court of Canada denied her claim.64 It rejected the argument
that discriminatory treatment of pregnant persons constitutes sex dis-
crimination. According to Ritchie J., "[a]ny inequity between the
sexes in this area is not created by legislation but by nature. '65
A second serious problem stemming more from the liberal com-
ponent of the hybrid conception of equality relates to the formal de-
mand for equal treatment. There are two ways in which this demand
has inadvertently contributed to the continued oppression of women.
First, the doctrine of equal treatment in the "public sphere" only
helps those women who can emulate men and meet the standards of
a male-dominated world. It fails to pose the question of why many
women cannot meet the standards in the first place. MacKinnon ex-
plains this with reference to the United States Supreme Court deci-
sion, Reed v. Reed,66 the first case in which a sex-based legislative class-
ification was struck down under the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States' Constitution. The sta-
tute gave automatic preference to men as administrators of estates
rather than requiring a hearing into the merits of the individual appli-
cants. The Court held that to assume, for the sake of administrative
convenience, that most men would be better administrators than
women was discriminatory and unconstitutional. However, as Mac-
Kinnon points out, in a world where women have been systematically
excluded from business affairs, "a legal guarantee of equal considera-
tion would make little difference to most women who would merely
be rejected individually as estate administrators."67
For a Canadian example, we can look at the human rights deci-
sion in Larouche v. Emergency Car Rental.68 Larouche was refused the
use of a five ton truck by a Montreal rental agency because she was
63 S.C. 1970-71-72, c. 48.
64 Bliss v. Attorney-General of Canada, [1979] 1 S.C.R. 183, [1978] 6 W.W.R. 711, 92
D.L.R. (3d) 417, 23 N.R. 527 (S.C.C.).
65 Ibid., p. 422 (D.L.R.).
66 (1971), 404 U.S. 71.
67 MacKinnon, supra, note 62 at p. 108.
68 (1980), 1 C.H.R.R. D/119 (Que. Prov. Ct., Mont. Div.).
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a woman and the rentor assumed that women were not as capable as
men in driving trucks. Larouche was an experienced truck and bus
driver. In concluding that the rental agency had discriminated, the
Court stated, "il ne s'enquit m~me pas de son expdrience et qu'il a
prdsum6 injustement et sans motif qu'elle ne pouvait conduire un ca-
mion parce qu'elle 6tait du sexe frminin. '"69 By implication, had the
rental agency inquired into Larouche's experience and found it lack-
ing, it may well have been justified in refusing to rent her a truck. It
is likely that the majority of women still lack experience driving
trucks. They lack the disposable income to buy cars as readily as men
and they are discriminated against in seeking traditionally male jobs
such as truck driving. As in the Reed case, a large number of women
would have been excluded from renting a truck because of inadequate
individual qualifications. Current equality theory, however, fails to ad-
dress this problem. Rather than viewing this situation as a manifesta-
tion of even more serious sexual inequality, it would not be identified
as a problem of discrimination:
What about the women whom the stereotypes describe? What if, because a
stereotype has set a standard that most women have had little choice but to
meet, few women have escaped being measured against it and shaped by it?
Why should the exceptional individual, who can argue that the stereotype
does not apply to her, be the only one who can assert that the stereotype
disadvantages her when most women live a sex-stereotyped reality? 0
In practical terms, therefore, anti-discrimination laws often work to
the advantage of a minority of women-the "exceptional" women
have proven that they can be "successful" in the male-defined and
dominated world. For those women who fail to achieve male-defined
success, it becomes their fault rather than the system's. The blame-
the-victim tendency continues subtly but powerfully.
The second way in which the demand for equal treatment inad-
vertently contributes to the continued subordination of women is by
implicitly devaluing "female-associated" 71 skills, activities, and
values. Male-defined standards are left unchallenged; women simply
claim an equal ability to conform to them. In the process of doing so,
69 Ibid., at D/119.
70 MacKinnon, supra, note 62 at p. 122. See also Note, "Toward a Redefinition of
Sexual Equality" (1981-82), 95 Harv. L.R. 487 for a discussion of the problems
associated with an assimilationist approach to sexual equality.
71 Angela Miles uses the term "female-associated" to describe those skills, values
and activities traditionally associated with women. See note 15, supra.
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however, women's traditional work and values are devalued. The
"career woman" is often viewed as superior to the "housewife".
Women are thereby divided and victimization takes deeper roots. As
Angela Miles writes:
To claim women's humanity only insofar as women can show themselves to
be like (as good as) men is to challenge men's definition of women but not
their definition of humanity.7
Given the inadequacies of current equality theory, the women's
movement has begun to re-evaluate its demands. Two alternative ap-
proaches have emerged. Both propose dramatically different solutions
to the contradictions and shortcomings of earlier formulations of legal
equality for women. One urges absolute gender neutrality in the law;
the second proposes an open acknowledgement of sex differences
stemming from the social reality of inequality.
The first response to the inadequacies of equality theory, the gen-
der neutrality approach, requires the tensions between claims for
equality and claims for special treatment be resolved by carrying the
liberal perspective to its most extreme conclusion. The law is to be
absolutely sex neutral. Under no circumstances should sex constitute
a valid basis for legal classification, not even when seemingly justified
or dictated by biological differences. For example, Wendy Williams
argues that the need for compensated time off work around childbirth
should not be addressed by special maternity leave legislation; rather,
pregnancy leave should be covered under the general rubric of short
term disability benefits. 73 To do otherwise, Williams argues, is to rein-
force outmoded stereotypes. Special legislative measures for women
will inevitably backfire to perpetuate gender stereotypes and discrimi-
nation against women.
Does this formulation of absolute equal treatment do justice to
the legal struggle for women's liberation? It would no doubt effec-
tively redress the judicial confusion over socially versus biologically
72 Supra, note 15 at p. 218.
73 "Sex Discrimination under the Charter: Some Problems of Theory" (1983), 4
C.H.R.R. C/83-1 at C/83-4; for a further elaboration of this perspective, see
Williams, "The Equality Crisis: Some Reflections on Courts, Culture and
Feminism" (1983), 7 Women's Rights L.R. 173. See also Canadian Advisory
Council on the Status of Women, "Women, Human Rights and the Constitution:
Submission to the Special Joint Committee on the Constitution" (1981), 2
C.H.R.R. C/35.
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based differences. The persistent legacy of "separate sphere" ideology
would finally be eradicated, However, the absolute gender neutrality
solution fails to address other criticisms made of current equality
theory. Indeed, it may even accentuate them. It fails to challenge male-
defined standards, meaning "exceptional" women who do not fit trad-
itional female stereotypes continue to be the main beneficiaries.
Moreover, the facial neutrality of the law may mask the continuing
reality of women's oppression. For example, the Criminal Code'4 now
speaks of sexual offences as though both men and women are equally
prone to sexual violence when in reality it is men who rape and sexu-
ally assault women or other men. As Christine Boyle notes, the law
does not acknowledge "the unequal burden of victimization that
women bear in this context. 75
It should be noted that proponents of sexual neutrality in the law
do not reject the need for affirmative action. It is justified, however,
in a narrow and liberal way as a mechanism to achieve equality:
groups that are discriminated against have been set back; affirmative'
action programs are devices for bringing such groups up to the start-
ing line with everyone else.16
Many proponents of the absolute neutrality response do not be-
lieve it falls short of the full needs of feminist equality theory. Even
those who perceive its shortcomings maintain that it is the best that
may be done in the present constraints and biases of a male-dominated
judicial system. According to Williams:
[Clourts will do no more than measure women's claim to equality against
legal benefits and burdens that are an expression of white, male middle-class
interests and values. This means, to rephrase the point, that women's equality
as delivered by the courts can only be an integration into a pre-existing, pre-
dominantly male world.n
The alternative response goes in the opposite direction. It begins
by acknowledging real differences between men and women, an ad-
mission anathema to the liberal response. Given the importance of
gender in our society, it maintains that women and men have funda-
74 R.S.C. 1970, c. C-34, as amended S.C. 1980-81-82--83, c. 125, s. 19. The new
provisions on sexual assault are contained in sections 246.1-246.3.
75 Boyle, supra, note 36 at p. 41.
76 See Williams, "Sex Discrimination Under the Charter," supra, note 73, at C186-
6.
77 Williams, The Equality Crisis, supra, note 73 at p. 175.
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mentally different social experiences. 78 One manifestation of these dif-
ferences is the sex segregation of society. Women continue to predomi-
nate in certain kinds of work and are associated with particular values
and characteristics (e.g., nurturing, altruism, caring). According to the
proponents of this approach, "female-associated" skills and values
must be recognized and encouraged in society rather than devalued
or ignored. This constitutes one of the central tasks of the pursuit of
gender equality. Indeed, differential treatment which takes into ac-
count the differences between the sexes is considered both acceptable
and necessary in some instances. Thus, special maternity benefits are
advocated on the grounds that the special abilities of women to have
children should be reflected in the law and acknowledged by society.
Two tensions surface with respect to this approach. One stems
from the celebration of the traditional values and activities of women
and the concomitant condemnation of the subordination of women.
The effects of male domination have been damaging to women, pre-
venting us from being or becoming the individuals we would be in a
non-sexist society. Thus, this approach should also embrace the de-
mand for the kinds of social transformation that would give women
the opportunities to develop to our fullest potential. This may mean
gaining access to traditionally-male spheres of activity, while challeng-
ing the standards in those spheres when necessary.
The second tension relates to the role of law as a possible con-
tributor to social change. A demand that the law not be sex neutral-
that it make clear the different social realities inhabited by women and
men-provokes a fear that the law will reinforce relations of domina-
tion and subordination between men and women, reproduce the ef-
fects of conservatism, and thereby limit societal attitudes about the
abilities, aspirations and talents of women. In short, the law may be
used to entrench the deleterious effects of sex stereotyping.
Given these two current responses to the problems of equality
theory, what approach should be adopted with respect to the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms?
5. RETHINKING SEXUAL EQUALITY
In this final section, I intend to present the general approach to
gender equality I believe should be taken in the Charter cases. While
78 See supra, note 15; see also Sarah Salter, Extended Identity: A Feminist Intuition of
Self/Other and its Implications for Theories of Justice and Rights, New England
School of Law, 1984 (manuscript).
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it attempts to integrate some aspects of both of the responses just out-
lined, it relies primarily on the second approach.
The ongoing reality of women's oppression makes it essential that
the attainment of sexual equality constitute a central objective of soci-
ety. The starting point for a theory of sexual equality should be an
acknowledgement of the subordination of women in society. The law
should not mask social reality by speaking merely in terms of the dif-
ferential treatment of the sexes. Rather, it must be recognized that
women systematically have been treated as inferior to men. As Mac-
Kinnon notes, "the imagery of hierarchy, not just of difference '"79
must animate judicial decisions. This approach goes beyond liberal
legalism by necessitating the identification of forms of social domina-
tion. 0 The central question to be asked, therefore, in interpreting the
gender equality provisions of the Charter is: does the statute, policy,
practice or action contribute to the social inequality of women?
The application of this open-ended test for gender equality neces-
sitates a contextual approach"' directed at the actual experiences of
women. It also requires Charter litigation to entail a process of educat-
ing judges about how, why and when women are oppressed in society.
Since the abstract and reified nature of legal reasoning has made it
difficult in the past for judges to identify what most women would
immediately recognize as inferior treatment, the "good sense '8 2 of
"ordinary women" about the realities of their oppression should be
injected, whenever possible, into the legal process.
To identify problems of inequality, it is also important to go
beyond procedures and intentions to a consideration of outcomes and
effects. 13 A results-oriented approach ensures that institutionalized or
systemic forms of discrimination and facially-neutral provisions
which have a disparate impact on women are prohibited by the Char-
79 MacKinnon, supra, note 62 at p. 102.
80 It was with parallel reasoning with respect to black oppression that the United
States Supreme Court struck down racial segregation in the schools; see Brown
v. Board of Education (1954), 347 U.S. 483.
81 Jill McCalla Vickers, "Memoirs of an Ontological Exile: The Methodological
Rebellions of Feminist Research" in Miles and Finn, eds., supra, note 15, p. 27
at pp. 34-37. Madame Justice Bertha Wilson has also advocated a contextual ap-
proach to Charter adjudication; see Goodman Lecture No. 2, University of Toronto,
November 27, 1985, p. 17.
82 This idea was inspired by Antonio Gramsci's discussion of common sense and
good sense in relation to the "masses"; see Prison Notebooks, eds. & trans. Q.
Hoare & G. Smith (New York: International Publishers, 1972), pp. 419-425.
83 A concern with effects is illustrated in R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., supra, note
32; see especially Wilson J.'s concurring judgment.
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ter. By emphasizing equality of outcomes or results, concerns about
fairness generated by any shift away from absolute neutral treatment
are also assuaged. Differential treatment is justified when it is aimed
at securing equal results.
With these two general suggestions in mind-that a contextual
and results-oriented approach be adopted-how would courts con-
front specific questions about when differential and when similar treat-
ment are necessary? In particular, we must consider how to respond
to what Martha Minow refers to as the "difference dilemma":
Identification or acknowledgement of a trait of difference, associated by the
dominant group with minority identity, risks recreating occasions for major-
ity discrimination based on that trait. Non-identification or non-acknow-
ledgement, however, risks recreating occasions for discrimination based on
majority practices, like tests, norms and judgments forged with regard solely
for the perspective, needs, and interests of the dominant group.8
Courts will be faced with two types of situations relating to the
social inequality of women. First, they will be confronted with cases
where differential treatment is currently afforded to men and women.
This may result in inequality if women are treated less favourably than
men. It may be, however, that the differential treatment benefits
women (e.g. maternity leave). Second, courts will encounter situa-
tions where facially-neutral treatment has a disproportionately adverse
impact on women.
In both of these situations, a court's first task is to determine
whether the impugned law, policy or practice is operating to the detri-
ment of women. If so, the Charter should require a response. The na-
ture of this response, however, deserves careful consideration and an
appreciation of the "difference dilemma".
When differential treatment entails less favourable treatment of
women, the remedy required will be equal treatment. Where differen-
tial treatment provides a genuine benefit to women, 5 this benefit
84 Supra, note 16 at p. 160.
85 It is essential that the benefit be genuine since, historically, numerous legislative
provisions labelled as beneficial to women were in fact burdensome. The decision
in R. v. Burnshine, [1975] 1 S.C.R. 693 (S.C.C.), [19741 4 W.W.R. 49, 25
C.R.N.S. 270, 44 D.L.R. (3d) 584, 2 N.R. 53, 15 C.C.C. (2d) 505 in which the
Supreme Court of Canada held it was a benefit for the young offender to be
incarcerated for a longer period, demonstrates the importance of this initial ques-
tion. Although this approach requires judges to make difficult value assessments,
I do not think this can be avoided.
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should be retained in some way. The judicial inquiry, however, should
not end at this point. To ascertain how best to retain the beneficial
effect of differential treatment without contributing to the potential
social stigma associated with difference, courts should ask themselves
the following questions.
First, courts should ask why women as a group generally seem
to need the special treatment. What social inequity or injustice does
it serve to ameliorate? This inquiry will demand that judges consider
the socio-historic roots of current inequality. In some cases, it may be
possible for the legislator to reword the statute in question to respond
more accurately to the social problem primarily faced by women. In
form, the statute would be sex neutral; in effect, it would primarily
affect women. If a man experienced the same difficulty, however, he
would also be covered by the provision. 86
The second question should be whether the special treatment
could be extended generally to include men as well as women. One
example might be the application of the occupational health standards,
designed for women, to men.8 7 If society can heighten protection for
all workers, this would constitute a viable and desirable solution.
Another example would be the extension of paternity leave provi-
sions.
The third question should be whether it is possible to eradicate
the source of the problem rather than merely treat its symptoms. Im-
plicit in this consideration is the need to acknowledge the needs of
women and to transform institutions, workplaces, and social struc-
tures to meet these needs. This constitutes a significant divergence
from the strategy of changing women to fit into male-dominated in-
stitutions by either conforming to male-defined standards or being
treated as an exceptional atiomaly for whom special measures must
be created. As Mary Daly has stated: "What is required of women at
this point in history is a firm and deep refusal to limit our perspectives,
questioning and creativity to any preconceived patterns of male-domi-
nated culture. '"88 An analysis of sexual equality issues through this re-
86 A number of equality theorists have identified such an analysis. For instance,
Professor Lahey has identified a "sex neutral/gender specific" approach, in
"Equality and Specificity in Feminist Thought," paper presented to the Charter
of Rights Education Fund Meeting, August 4, 1983. Diana Majury also suggested
it in a lecture on "Women and Equality," Charterwatch class, Dalhousie Law
School, November, 1983.
87 This suggestion was made by Nancy Miller Chenier, supra, note 54.
88 Beyond God the Father, Toward a Philosophy of Women's Liberation (Boston: Beacon
Press, 1973), p. 7.
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focused lens also contains the potential to enhance the goal of full
human liberation. 9
This last question should also be asked when courts are faced with
a situation of discrimination resulting from the disparate impact of
facially-neutral laws, policies or practices. Before adopting a diffe-
rential treatment response to systemic discrimination, the validity of
the norms, values and standards of the system should be challenged.
Working for this transformation through the courts may prove
difficult, given the typically narrow formulation of legal issues.
Courts are often faced with options A or B when the solution is C.
Nevertheless, judges and lawyers should make every effort to address
both the immediate issues and the underlying assumptions and found-
ations of sex discrimination. One mechanism for doing this is through
the creative structuring of remedies.
Judges may find themselves in a position where they believe dif-
ferential treatment is needed to secure equality of outcomes, but still
fear that such treatment may reinforce stereotypes about women and
thereby perpetuate inequality. Should courts allow or promote diffe-
rential treatment at the expense of perpetuating or creating female
stereotypes? In responding to this question, we must begin by asking
ourselves why the existence of female stereotypes is bad. Certainly,
we do not want to endorse reliance on unfair generalizations in the
assessment of individuals. Moreover, a rejection of the dichotomies
of a sex-stereotyped world would allow the unfolding of each person's
full human potential. Nevertheless, our fear of female stereotypes
seems to reflect the very male dominance we seek to overcome.
Female-associated stereotypes are considered undesirable; male-as-
sociated stereotypes are praised. Rather than acquiesce in this classifi-
cation and bury female-associated stereotypes, we need to celebrate
and encourage the extension of many of those stereotypes for their
importance to the development of a caring, humane, and just society.90
In essence, this last point raises the problem of differences being
conceptualized through the categories of "dominant/subordinate,
good/bad, up/down, superior/inferior."91 The process of validating
female-associated stereotypes entails a willingness to claim our equal-
ity through the assertion rather than the denial of difference.
89 Ibid., p. 25.
90 Miles, supra, note 15 at p. 221.
91 Lorde, supra, note 16 at p. 114.
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Returning to the specific equality provisions in the Charter, is it
possible to adopt the approach outlined above? What guidelines can
be provided for this interpretive task? Although I do not intend to
engage in a detailed prescriptive analysis of how the text of the Charter
should be interpreted, I shall make a few general suggestions.
First, a contextual, results-oriented approach is supported by the
language of section 15. As previously noted, section 15(1) includes the
right to "equal protection" and "equal benefit" of the law. The latter
phrase, in particular, contemplates an outcomes-oriented approach. 92
In addition, the inclusion of the phrase "before and under the law"
represents a clear message to courts that they are not to adopt the
narrow Diceyan interpretation of equality applied for example in the
intepretation of the Canadian Bill ofRights in Attorney General ofCanada
v. Lavell; Isaac et al. v. Bedard.9
Subsection 15(1) also includes a provision for non-discrimination.
Equality before and under the law and equal protection and benefit
of the law are to be secured "without discrimination". Although dis-
crimination is sometimes defined simply as the making of a distinction
or differential treatment of persons or groups, this definition is in-
sufficient in the legal context. The detrimental effect or result of the
making of such distinctions must be part of the definition. The latter
approach has been adopted in some human rights documents. For
example, section 10 of the Quebec Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms
states:
Every person has a right to full and equal recognition and exercise of his [or
her] rights and freedoms, without distinction, exclusion or prefer-
ence .... Discrimination exists where such a distinction, exclusion or prefer-
ence has the effect of nullifying or impairing such right.-,
Similarly, in the International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms
of Discrimination Against Women, discrimination is defined in Article 1
to include
any distinction, exclusion or restriction made on the basis of sex which has
the effect or purpose of impairing or nullifying the recognition, enjoyment
92 This phrase was included to respond directly to the outcome in the Bliss case,
supra, note 64 and to ensure explicitly against a recurrence. See also discussion
accompanying note 43, supra.
93 (1973), 23 C.R.N.S. 197, 11 R.F.L. 333, 38 D.L.R. (3d) 481 (S.C.C.).
94 R.S.Q. 1977, c. C-12, as amended.
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or exercise by women, irrespective of their marital status, on a basis of equal-
ity of men and women, of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural, civil or any other field.9"
Discrimination, therefore, should be interpreted as the subordination
of an individual by virtue of her or his membership in a particular
class of persons or the subordination of a social group. This definition
would not render all forms of differential treatment discriminatory. If
the differential treatment ensured equal outcomes and did not there-
fore subject individuals or groups to subordination, it would not vio-
late subsection 15(1).
The inclusion of subsection 15(2) in the Charter further buttresses
this conclusion. As Tarnopolsky suggests, subsection 15(2) should not
be read as an exception to subsection 15(1), but rather as an interpretive
guide to subsection 15(t). In his view, subsection 15(2) was added out
of "excessive caution":96
In line with the argument suggested earlier, that equal laws can result in in-
equality if applied to persons in unequal circumstances, it is suggested that
"any law, program or activity that has its object the amelioration of conditions
of disadvantaged individuals or groups" cannot be in contravention of subsec-
tion (1) of section 15, even without subsection (2) saying so.'
Section 28 also lends itself to a contextual results-oriented ap-
proach by guaranteeing the rights and freedoms in the Charter equally
to women and men. The radical potential of this section becomes ap-
parent if we contemplate the notion of equal liberty or security of the
person for women and men.
The final section that I wish to address is section 1-the linchpin
of Charter interpretation. Section 1 should not allow society to justify
the creation or perpetuation of sexual inequality. There are at least two
ways to avoid compromising the objective of gender equality through
section 1. First, in accordance with Professor de Jong's argument, sec-
tion 28 could be interpreted to render section 1 inapplicable to issues
involving equality between the sexes.98 Second, it could be decided
by the courts that it is never "reasonable or demonstrably justified in
a free and democratic society" to uphold a provision or practice which
95 U.N. Doc. AIRES1341180 (1979), adopted December 18, 1979, in force for
Canada January 10, 1982.
96 Tarnopolsky, "The Equality Rights in the Canadian Charter of Rights and Free-
doms," supra, note 43 at p. 250.
97 Ibid.
98 Supra, note 44.
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creates or perpetuates the social inequality of women.
6. CONCLUSION
The impact of the equality provisions of the Charter on the strug-
gle for sexual equality remains an open question. The language of the
Charter is malleable and broad enough to support a number of in-
terpretations. It would be impossible to devise a rule-like legal for-
mula which would adequately respond to the myriad social realities
of inequality. Moreover, the ideological and political leanings of
judges will play an important role in shaping legal outcomes.
Current equality theory represents a confused amalgam of differ-
ent ideological biases and beliefs. Its shortcomings are manifold. It is
focused on procedural rather than on substantive equality; it implicitly
accepts the dominant world view as universal; and it only helps those
members of an oppressed group that can emulate and adopt the stan-
dards, values, and characteristics of those who dominate in society.
These problems stem from its liberal assumptions, as does its
methodological crisis, all of which result from a misplaced notion of
the political neutrality of the rule of law. In addition, courts often
revert to conservative assumptions about the role of women, thereby
perpetuating the patriarchal bias of legal outcomes. Nevertheless, the
influences of post-liberal thinking on equality theory have been posi-
tive. The most important has been the growing acceptance of effects-
based reasoning with its acknowledgement of systemic discrimination
and its focus on outcomes. It is into this theoretical context that the
Charter has entered.
What is clear from the Charter is its strong affirmation of the im-
portance of gender equality in Canadian society. Despite legal confu-
sion and inevitable uncertainty in Charter interpretation, we need to
think seriously about how the Charter can promote equality for
women. In this regard, it is important to insist on an interpretation
of the Charter that considers first and foremost whether the impugned
law or social practice injures women and contributes to their con-
tinued subordination. In so doing, judges should affirm "female-as-
sociated" skills and values and denounce the exclusion of women from
male-dominated spheres of activity. In the final analysis, however, the
generation of ethical and moral answers to the difficult questions
which will confront our courts will depend not on any elaborate legal
theory of equality, but rather on the ability ofjudges to develop com-
passion and empathy for those who experience the realities of inequal-
ity and discrimination in our society.

